Possession, not ownership, is primary to forcible entry cases

(First of two parts)

As a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights,” said former American President James Madison.

Among these rights is that of prior possession, which the Supreme Court has extensively discussed in the recent Magsi v. Heirs of Ignacio A. Lopez, Jr.

In this case, petitioner Mercuria Magsi claims to have worked as an employee at the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) in Baguio City. During her employment, she resided at the National Government Dormitory in Jungle Town, Engineers’ Hill.

Also around this time, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1361, as amended, was passed, granting the national government the authority to sell cottages in Baguio City, including those in Jungle Town and Engineers’ Hill. Thus, Mercuria submitted the necessary application to the Engineers’ Hill Lotless Homeseekers Association Inc. (EHLHAI), of which she was a member. The EHLHAI referred this application to the Screening and Recommending Awards Committee, which granted it and awarded to Mercuria Lot No. 50, which she had been occupying and on which she had a bodega built.

Mercuria eventually rebuilt her bodega into a residential house and declared it as such for tax purposes. In the subsequent years, she often traveled overseas but ensured that she could visit Lot No. 50 and instructed her children to handle the processing of the award and its titling.

Nevertheless, one of Ignacio A. Lopez Jr.’s heirs, respondent Rodolfo Barnachea Sr., threatened to cause the demolition of Mercuria’s house or otherwise file a legal action if her children did not vacate it. While Mercuria’s children were on vacation, Rodolfo and his co-respondents, Ignacio’s other heirs, enclosed Lot No. 50 with G.I. sheets, wood, and interlink fences, attached a “No Trespassing” sign, and placed guard dogs around it.

These circumstances constrained Mercuria to file against respondents a complaint for forcible entry and damages before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC). Here, Mercuria alleged that respondents’ claim to Lot No. 50 was fraudulent since she had always been its owner through the issuance of the Award and Certificate of Title pursuant to R.A. No. 1361, as amended.

Meanwhile, in their answer, respondents countered that Rodolfo had only acted to protect Ignacio’s interest to the disputed lot. Moreover, Mercuria purportedly built a shanty encroaching Lot No. 49, which respondents had only been claiming. She had been renting out this shanty without any building permit, thus supposedly constraining the City Government of Baguio to recommend its demolition and motivating Rodolfo to approach Mercuria and her children.

The MTCC and upon appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), ruled in favor of Mercuria, directing respondents to surrender to her their possession of Lot No. 50.

Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ findings. In so doing, it held that respondents have a possession de facto over the disputed lot—that is, as holders of a Torrens title over Lot No. 49, where Lot No. 50 was located, as earlier agreed upon by the parties, respondents had a stronger claim to possession as part of ownership.

While Mercuria proved that she had prior physical possession over Lot No. 50, it still consisted of the portion of the titled lot in Ignacio’s name. In this regard, when Ignacio bought Lot No. 49 from the government and caused its registration in his name, he became the constructive possessor of Lot No. 49.

Likewise, the Court of Appeals held that possession could be acquired through juridical acts, including the execution and registration of the deed of absolute sale executed in favor of Ignacio. Thus, Mercuria’s claim of possession based on her physical occupation and pending sale from the government could not supersede Ignacio’s titled ownership and the resulting constructive possession of Lot No. 50.

With the foregoing incidents, Mercuria filed before the Supreme Court the instant petition, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Court of Appeals’ findings.

(To be continued)