A gem of wisdom in the Corona impeachment trial
At each session since Day 1 of the impeachment trial, important lessons are laid for future generations’ references.
Several legal evidentiary terms and principles have been debated upon. Witnesses were asked to be characterized as ordinary or expert witnesses. Even the meaning of authentication of documents has been discussed.
Objections to irrelevant, leading, misleading, argumentative and hypothetical questions were likewise raised in the course of the testimony of the witnesses so far presented.
We expect more to come—what with the prosecution including on its list of witnesses—without much thought perhaps—more than 100 prosecution witnesses.
Indeed, the impeachment trial shows the interplay between the rules of pleading and rules of evidence. More importantly, it demonstrates the real-life interface between procedural rules and the constitutional rights of the individual citizen.
Of particular note in the recent past is the legal debate over paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the impeachment complaint.
These two paragraphs are subsumed under Article II of the impeachment complaint, which charges the Chief Justice of culpable violation of the Constitution and/or betrayal of public trust “when he failed to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth as required under Sec. 17, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.”
By way of rider, however, the impeachment complaint included paragraph 2.3, which states that “[i]t is also reported that some of the properties of Respondent are not included in his declaration of his assets, liabilities, and networth, in violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act.” Further, the complaint included paragraph 2.4, which alleges that “[r]espondent is likewise suspected and accused of having accumulated ill-gotten wealth, acquiring assets of high values and keeping bank accounts with huge deposits.”
So, why did the complainants make paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 mere riders to Article II and not separate grounds for impeachment? Why did they not assert the matters mentioned therein as facts?
Contrary to what many believe, this is not a case of poor draftsmanship. It was a deliberate decision.
The complainants carefully employed the words “reported,” “suspected” and “accused” because the Constitution requires that the complaint must be under oath.
By stating the matters as based on reports and suspicion, not as facts, they protect themselves from perjury charges, at the same time hoping that they would be able to smuggle in evidence on alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Chief Justice.
In layman’s language, they want to have their cake and eat it, too.
But the ploy did not escape the razor-sharp legal minds of the defense panel.
They objected to any evidence on paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 on the ground that these allegations do not satisfy the requirement of pleading for a valid allegation in an impeachment complaint under both the Rules of Court and the Constitution.
What is not validly alleged cannot be proven in court, as the time-tested Justice Cuevas eloquently argued before the impeachment court.
The ruling
Not satisfied with registering a continuing objection as ordinary trial lawyers would have done, the defense panel forced the issue and moved for a quick ruling.
In its ruling last week, the Senate barred the introduction of any evidence on paragraph 2.4.
Although the Senate could have been justified in excluding evidence on paragraph 2.3, the Senate decided to allow the panel to introduce evidence on the matter.
However, the Senate President made it crystal clear that the Senate will allow evidence on this paragraph only if the prosecution will identify with specificity what assets are not included in the SALN.
Gem of wisdom
The ruling strikes a balance between the interest of the state in an impeachment case, and the rights of a citizen guaranteed by the Constitution.
It acknowledges that an impeachment case is not purely a judicial proceeding, but a political exercise as well.
It accommodates the prosecution panel’s plea for flexibility and liberality, without sacrificing the basic rights of the respondent. It recognizes the unique circumstances surrounding this particular case.
Why do I say so?
First, in the interest of the public, the ruling allows evidence on other properties to the extent that they are not included in the SALN of the Chief Justice.
But to protect the constitutional rights of the individual citizen, the ruling inextricably requires that the prosecution must specify in detail what properties are not included in the SALN before the Senate will allow evidence thereon.
It bars a fishing expedition on the part of the prosecution. The prosecution cannot request for a blanket subpoena of witnesses and documents (as they initially did by requesting the court to subpoena bank documents without any specificity) in an effort to fish for evidence on what properties are not included in the SALN.
Evidently, the ruling gives meaning to a person’s constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial, especially with the full powers of the Presidency stacked up against the Chief Justice.
Second, the ruling will help minimize the portrayal of the Chief Justice as guilty in the bar of public opinion. As noted by Senator Judge Gregorio Honasan, the trial outside the courtroom seems to be moving swifter than in the impeachment court.
Observably, indeed, the prosecution public relations machine has been in full gear with no let-up even long before the impeachment trial started.
Since Day 1 of the trial, the prosecution panel has successfully portrayed the Chief Justice as guilty before the public. They exhibit their documents on television before they offer them in evidence.
In law, these are not evidence until they are formally admitted by the court.
Obviously, this actuation runs afoul of the Chief Justice Corona’s constitutional rights to be presumed innocent and due process of law.
To the extent that the ruling protects these constitutionally guaranteed rights without sacrificing the discovery of the truth, the ruling is full of wisdom that should merit the admiration of both the bar and the public. Kudos to the Senate President and the Senate!
The Corona case demonstrates beyond doubt why there is a bill of rights – to protect the individual from the vast powers of the state.
As Thomas Jefferson had said, a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government, and what no just government should refuse, or rest on inference.
To use the words of the Great Communicator, former US President Ronald Reagan, protecting the rights of even the least individual among us is basically the only excuse the government has for even existing.
(The author is a law professor at the Ateneo Law School. He can be contacted through [email protected].)
