The fate of Chief Justice Renato Corona now lies in the hands of the 23 senators of the Philippines.
Under the Constitution, the “Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.” Notably, however, the Constitution and the Senate Rules on Impeachment Trials are both silent on the standard of proof when the Senate acts as the impeachment court. Neither do we have any jurisprudence on the matter.
The big question then is what standard of proof should the senator-judges use in deciding the Corona impeachment case?
Different standards of proof
The Senate impeachment rules provide that the rules of court, which includes the rules on evidence, shall apply suppletorily to the impeachment proceedings.
The four main standards of proof under the rules of court are: (1) substantial evidence; (2) preponderance of evidence; (3) clear and convincing evidence; and (4) proof beyond reasonable doubt.
“Substantial evidence” refers to such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. In common parlance, it is the kind of evidence that a reasonable man can say “puwede na” to justify a conclusion. This is used in cases filed before administrative and quasijudicial bodies.
In civil cases, the standard of preponderance of evidence is synonymous with the phrase “greater weight of the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” To put it simply, the admitted evidence is weighed on the scales of justice, and judgment is rendered in favor of the side at which the scales tilt to.
Clear and convincing evidence is a more stringent standard that requires the allegation to be proven to the firm belief or satisfaction of the trier of fact. This standard requires that the evidence must be overwhelming enough to clearly indicate the winning party. To follow the same illustration on the scales of justice, the tilt must weigh heavily in favor of a party to the case.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the highest standard, which is applied in criminal cases. It requires moral certainty, or such degree of proof that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Although absolute uncertainty is not required, the evidence must undoubtedly show to an unprejudiced mind that the accused is guilty of the acts complained of. Again, using the scales of justice as an example, the scale must definitely and undoubtedly tilt in favor of the prosecution evidence.
Quantum of evidence
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court, including the Chief Justice, “may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” The Constitution further expressly provides that “[n]o person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.”
The Constitution uses the words “conviction” and “convicted.” Moreover, the Senate impeachment rules employ the phrases “plea of not guilty” and “plea of guilty.” This seems to suggest that the standard of proof required in impeachment proceedings is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Some also argue that since an impeachment proceeding partakes of the nature of a criminal proceeding, proof beyond reasonable doubt is the appropriate standard of proof. Others say that the use of proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary to maintain the balance of power under the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution.
On the other hand, some quarters point out that, unlike a criminal case where a person is deprived of life, liberty or property, a judgment in impeachment proceeding is limited to “removal from office and disqualification to hold any office.” This, of course, assumes that a job is not a property right protected by the Constitution, which is an altogether different debate.
Still others argue that the criminal standard of proof fails to recognize that the purpose of an impeachment proceeding is to protect public interest by getting rid of public officers unfit to remain in their constitutional positions. Consequently, public interest should weigh more heavily than the interest of the individual defendant. Indeed, constitutional deliberations seem to indicate that proof beyond reasonable doubt should not be the standard for impeachment proceedings.
Some argue that since an impeachment case is neither a civil nor a criminal proceeding, the standard of proof should be a middle ground between the usual civil standard (preponderance of evidence) and the criminal standard (proof beyond reasonable doubt). The appropriate standard, according to this school of thought, is clear and convincing evidence, as used in more important and specific civil cases.
This standard has been used in the United States. According to its proponents, this intermediate standard accomplishes the purpose of an impeachment proceeding, while recognizing the need to protect the independence of a coequal branch of government by avoiding unjustified removals from office.
Interestingly, the prosecution requested to subpoena Chief Justice Corona as their witness. In his ruling last Tuesday, Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, as presiding officer, denied the request because it would violate the Chief Justice’s constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Senator Enrile also mentioned that the impeachment rules follow some procedures used in criminal cases and if convicted, the Chief Justice will suffer the penalty of (a) removal from his position as Chief Justice and (b) suffer perpetual disqualification from holding any government position, thereby making it akin to a criminal case. The Senate upheld the ruling.
Even Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano, who disagreed with the Senate’s ruling insofar as Mrs. Corona and the children (including the son-in-law) are concerned, admits that Chief Justice Corona cannot be called to the witness stand.
Is this an indication that the Senate, as a body, will use proof beyond reasonable doubt as the standard of proof in the Corona impeachment complaint? Will the Senate adopt another standard of proof?
Whatever it is, the Senate should expressly adopt a uniform standard for the guidance of all parties concerned. The interest of fair play demands no less.
(The author, who is the co-managing partner of the Angara Concepcion Regala & Cruz Law Offices (ACCRALAW), teaches Evidence in the Ateneo Law School. He may be contacted at felim@accralaw.com.)