Jan was the registered owner of a parcel of land. The title, however, carried the inscription of his marriage to Julie. Upon their demise, their children, Rud and Ela, became the owners of the said land.
A few years later, the siblings demanded Spouses Meo and Norms to surrender the possession of the said land as the possession of the couple was merely tolerated by their parents during their lifetime. The spouses refused to vacate the land. They claimed that they own the property by virtue of an alleged Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Jan during his lifetime.
Rud and Ela were forced to file a Complaint for Annulment of Document, Recovery of Ownership and Possession with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary injunction, claiming that the Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by their father in favor of Meo and Norms is void on two grounds. First, that the signature of their father, Jan, as appearing thereon is a forgery; and second, that there is no conformity or consent given by their mother, Julie, to the alleged sale.
Meo and Norms maintained that they are owners of the property by virtue of the subject Deed of Absolute executed by Jan. To them, the consent of Julie was not necessary to effect a valid sale since the subject property was the sole property of Jan, having inherited the same from his paternal ancestors and the spouses had long been separated from bed and board.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
In support of their claims, the siblings presented, among others, a handwriting expert who testified that the questioned signature of Jan as appearing on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the latter’s standard signatures, were not written by one and the same person.
The spouses, on the other hand, harped on the alleged separation from bed and board of Jan and Julie and called to the witness stand Jan’s alleged paramour. Said witness testified that during the lifetime of Jan, he mortgaged, and subsequently sold the subject property to Meo and Norms.
Q: Does the title present a conclusive presumption that the land described therein was the capital of, and owned exclusively by Jan?
A: No. To the contrary, a rebuttable presumption is established in Article 116 of the Family Code.
The party who invokes that presumption must first establish that the property was acquired during the marriage because the proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. It is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired with conjugal funds and the presumption still applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.
Once the condition sine qua non is established, then the presumption that all properties acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one spouse or both spouses, are conjugal, remains until the contrary is proved.
Q: Who then has the burden to prove that the subject property was owned by both Jan and Julie?A: Meo and Norms are the ones who have the burden to overcome the presumption of conjugality. The presumption is created even if the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one spouse.
Therefore, the spouses’ postulation that the certificate of title having been registered in the name of Jan married to Julie establishes a conclusive presumption that the land described therein was owned exclusively by Jan is incorrect because it directly runs counter to Article 116 of the Family Code. The spouses should have endeavored to prove their claim that the subject property was the exclusive property of Jan.
Q: Given that the property is conjugal, is the consent of Julie required for the validity of the sale? A: Yes. Article 124 of the Family Code provides, among others, that the disposition or encumbrance without the written consent of the other spouse shall render the disposition or encumbrance void.
The fact that Jan and Julie were separated from bed and board at the time of the supposed sale of the subject property by Jan to the spouses did not exempt the disposition from the requirement of obtaining the other spouse’s consent under Article 116 of the Family Code. Jan was not without any recourse, he should have gotten the required authority from the court.
Given that the subject property was the conjugal property of Jan and Julie, then the sale of the subject property by Jan without the consent of Julie which the spouses contemplated in the Deed of Absolute Sale is void.
(Source: Sps. Anastacio vs Heirs of Coloma, G.R. No. 224572, August 27, 2020)
The author is Dean at the Lyceum of the Philippines University, Chairperson of Philippine Association of Law Schools, and founder of Mawis Law Office