Coli paid Ped for the rights over a 250-sqm lot in the outskirts of the city. Coli then constructed a house made of light materials on the lot. Coli then made this makeshift house his family’s abode.
Years later, Coli and Ped executed an agreement. Coli, as owner of the house, allowed Ped to live in the house for free provided Ped would maintain the cleanliness and orderliness of the house. Ped promised that he would voluntarily vacate the premises on Coli’s demand.
After many moons have passed, Coli informed Ped of his need of the house and demanded that Ped vacate the house. Ped refused.
Irked by Ped’s refusal, Coli filed an ejectment case against the former before the Metropolitan Trial Court. In his answer, Ped claimed that the case should be dismissed because neither he or Coli has a valid title or right of possession over the lot where the house stands.
Q: Whether the absence of title over the disputed property will divest the courts of jurisdiction to resolve the issue of possession?
A: No, the defendant’s claim of ownership of the disputed property will not divest the Metropolitan Trial Court of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case. Even if the pleadings raise the issue of ownership, the court may pass on such issue to determine only the question of possession, especially if the ownership is inseparably linked with the possession.
The adjudication on the issue of ownership is only provisional and will not bar an action between the same parties involving title to the land.
Q: Will the defense that the parties to the ejectment case are not the owners of the disputed lot allow the courts to renounce their jurisdiction over the case?
A: Ownership or the right to possess arising from ownership is not at issue in an action for recovery of possession.
The parties cannot present evidence to prove ownership or right to legal possession except to prove the nature of the possession when necessary to resolve the issue of physical possession. The same is true when the defendant asserts the absence of title over the property. The absence of title over the contested lot is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case.
Q: Is the principle of pari delicto applicable to ejectment cases?
A: No. The rule of pari delicto is expressed in the maxims ‘ex dolo malo non eritur actio’ and ‘in pari delicto potior est conditio defedentis.’ The law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement. It leaves the parties where it finds them. The application of the principle of pari delicto to a case of ejectment between squatters is fraught with danger.
To shut out relief to squatters on the ground of pari delicto would openly invite mayhem and lawlessness. A squatter would oust another squatter from possession of the lot that the latter had illegally occupied, emboldened by the knowledge that the courts would leave them where they are. Nothing would then stand in the way of the ousted squatter from re-claiming his prior possession at all cost.
Q: Who is entitled to the physical possession of the disputed property?
A: Coli is entitled to the physical possession of the property. The Kasunduan expressly articulated Coli’s forbearance. Coli did not require Ed to pay any rent but only to maintain the house and lot in good condition. Ed expressly vowed in the Kasunduan that he would vacate the property on demand. Ed’s refusal to comply with Coli’s demand to vacate made Ed’s continued possession of the property unlawful.
Case law on ejectment has treated relationship based on tolerance as one that is akin to a landlord-tenant relationship where the withdrawal of permission would result in the termination of the lease. The tenant’s withholding of the property would then be unlawful. (Source: Pajuyo vs CA, G.R. No. 146364, June 3, 2004)
The author is Dean of Lyceum of the Philippines University; chairperson of Philippine Association of Law Schools; and founder of Mawis Law Office