Leadership in a crisis situation
This article presents an appreciation of the issues surrounding the escape of 40 Filipino peacekeepers serving under the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). It will delve only on the military aspects, the tactical and operational concerns that transpired in Golan Heights. It will not discuss the political dimensions because they are within the realm of the UN, and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). It must be emphasized, however, that a political solution in a conflict situation does not necessarily mean that it is the best option, especially if the lives of the peacekeepers are at stake.
Sometimes, a military solution that can provide a better chance of success is untenable if political intervention takes center stage. That happened when the UN justified the actions of the UNDOF Force Commander, and the Force Commander branded the Filipinos to have committed acts of cowardice. This is grossly unfair devoid of any objective justification.
In the UNDOF command structure, the Philippine contingent is under the operational control of the Force Commander. The mission of UNDOF is to maintain the ceasefire between Israel and Syria forces, and to supervise the areas of separation and limitations. The Philippine Battalion mission is to conduct peacekeeping operation in the southern half of the area of separation. Since its establishment in 1974, there were but a few violations. However, the escalation of terrorist activities in the last two years changed the threat situation.
In fact, in 2013, 23 Filipino peacekeepers were kidnapped by antigovernment armed elements. There was always a big possibility of direct physical threat, cross border harassment, and infiltration. These circumstances put to a test the resolve of the Philippine and Fiji contingents. The Fijians ended up as hostages while the Filipinos fought it out with the rebels.
It must be emphasized that at the critical moment of the crisis when the Filipinos were ordered to surrender their firearms, it necessitated the need to shift the operational mode, from a purely peacekeeping to military operation. Time was of the essence. Lives of soldiers were on the line, and most importantly, their honor was being assailed and challenged.
In peacekeeping operation, the soldier is always on the defensive mode. The rules of engagement are more passive and conservative, avoiding as much as possible collateral damage, especially if civilians are involved.
In a military operation, there are set objectives to be accomplished, and its ultimate end state is victory. It exploits opportunities, avoids and neutralizes risks, employing every means to achieve an advantage to include fire and maneuver, escape and evasion, utilizes the element of surprise, psychological operation, etc. It employs the principles of war and the operational art of warfare. A commander’s guidance/intent in both cases is necessary to define the concept of operation.
What were the elements present that necessitated the use of military action? The attackers had the primordial objective of seizing the peacekeepers, forcing them to surrender their firearms, and if necessary, killing them. They had all the will and capability and superior firepower. The seven-hour fire fight proved this point. The reverse was true to the Fijians. They buckled down under extreme threat and pressure. Extreme situation brings out the best in leadership. It was an opportunity that could have made the Force Commander a great leader and conversely, it made Col. Ezra Enriquez become an instant hero.
The Golan Heights fiasco was not a question of a breakdown of the chain of command but the indecisive and vacillating attitude of the Force Commander that created a vacuum in the command structure which must be immediately filled up in a crisis of this nature. At that point also, the Force Commander could have shifted the mode to a military operation to resolve the conflict. A positive action is within the rules of engagement.
At that point also, the Filipino Commander, Col. Enriquez, took the initiative because he was fully aware that if they would surrender the firearms, his military capabilities to confront the rebels successfully would shift from a fighting chance to a hopeless case. He filled up the gap in the command line which the Force Commander was unwilling to assume. By compromising the lives of his soldiers, the Force Commander lost his moral authority to influence the situation in order to achieve a military advantage.
Although I have the advantage of a hindsight knowing the outcome, generally, wise and reasonable judgement favors the bold, daring, and decisive. Furthermore, he did not act unilaterally. He consulted the highest leadership of the AFP because he did not find relief and support from the force commander. The Force Commander’s mandate assumes a wide latitude of options to protect the interests of the UN and the Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs). He failed to exercise these options.
It is essential to understand the military mindset. In the words of former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, “peacekeeping is not the job of a soldier, but only a soldier can do it.” The Filipino peacekeeper serving UNDOF had an average of 15 years of active military service, had experienced actual combat, well-trained, well-motivated, and among the best and the brightest. In short, they are world-class.
On this note, the action of the Filipino contingent commander was deliberate, circumspect, adhered to the chain of command, and, up to the last moment, exercised wise judgement and discretion. He could not be faulted because he was influenced by his military mindset.
At the time, it was the best option in order to survive. A more liberal approach that is dependent on the leisure of time, prolonged discussion, unending negotiations, tainted with political color have very little place in a volatile crisis situation that requires fast and swift decisions. Probably, it dawned into his mind, of the human atrocities normally committed by rebels, and the possible beheading if they surrender. It is an act of treason and disloyalty if you capitulate with a terrorist.
The fiasco exposed a number of lapses and inadequacies in the UNDOF mission.
Lack of intelligence on the rebel structure, strengths and weaknesses, personalities, tactics and strategies. In the UN doctrine, military intelligence is not used; instead, military information is the term used. In an environment of escalating terrorist and rebel activities, an intensified and integrated military information program is a requisite to prevent and neutralize passive and actual threats.
The immediate reaction to the incident did not portray the presence of an adequate immediate response force that can react to any contingencies. Why did the Fijians and the Filipinos not receive immediate reinforcements when attacked by the rebel forces?
The increasing threat level in the UNDOF mission area of responsibility necessitates upgrading the strength and wherewithal, force protection, to include communication capability in order to create a robust force under an environment of escalating terrorist threats.
The incident is a blessing in disguise. It portrayed the Filipino soldiers as world-class, especially when it comes to bravery and leadership. They made us proud that generated full support, not only of the AFP but the whole country as well.
And lastly, while I have high respect for the UN having once served under its umbrella, it should prescribe a policy in the strongest terms that UN personnel, especially peacekeepers serving world-wide, shall never negotiate with terrorists. And all democratic and freedom-loving nations must adhere to this resolve.
(This article reflects the personal opinion of the author and does not reflect the official stand of the Management Association of the Philippines. The author was the first Force Commander of the 24-Nation Multi-National United Nations Peacekeeping Force in East Timor with the rank of Assistant Secretary General. He is a Retired Commanding General of the Philippine Army and a Member of the MAP National Issues Committee. Feedback at <[email protected]> and <[email protected]>. For previous articles, please visit www.map.org.ph)
